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This article applies the concept of frames of reference to contemporary work and
welfare dynamics by focusing on the growing relevance of company welfare in Italy after
the 2008 crisis. The analysis considers how this occurred along three phases: in the
first, a path-breaking case, Luxottica, demonstrates the potential of company welfare;
then, Renzi’s government promotes company welfare through tax breaks; finally, trade
unions try to affect the diffusion of company welfare, displaying contrasting ideologies
as well as pragmatic joint solutions in the process. Overall, two contiguous sub-frames
– consultative unitarism and collaborative pluralism – offer the mainstream justification
to the events and the policy debate around them, a debate in which the industrial
relations scholarship played a key role. However, a critical interpretation is present too,
suggesting that the relevance of company welfare is driven by the mobilisation of a
political and economic elite and results in few cases of positive employment relations
alongside broad social and economic imbalances.
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Frames of reference (FoR) – unitarist, pluralist and radical, plus a few combina-
tions – reflect a particular perspective on the nature of employment relations
(Heery, 2016a). It is a concept that emphasises the ideological and normative
aspect of the study of industrial relations (IR) (Fox, 1974; Tapia et al., 2015)
and, as such, it has so far encountered mixed academic fortunes. On the one
hand, scholars have used it extensively to examine IR as a subject of study and
discuss its theoretical boundaries and foundations, usually by categorising
approaches and academics into a particular frame (Barry and Wilkinson, 2016;
Kaufman, 2004). On the other hand, the application of FoR to explain industrial
relations practices seems rather limited, as if the ‘political’ properties of FoR men-
tioned above would bring into question researchers’ impartiality and objectivity.
We argue, instead, that FoR offer a powerful interpretative tool for understanding,
both in practice and in theory, social phenomena that are outside of their custom-
ary area of application, the employment relationship (Ackers, 2002). To demon-
strate it, our study appreciates FoR in relation to wider work and welfare
dynamics by using them to investigate company welfare provisions, here defined
as a broad basket of non-monetary forms of compensation that are set at the
company level and usually include healthcare insurance and retirement plans, can-
teen and recreational facilities, paid vacation and educational tuition reimburse-
ment, and that, more recently, extend to childcare assistance, wellness programs
and even discounts in supermarkets and gyms (Society for Human Resource
Management (SHRM), 2018).
The focus here is on the growing relevance of company welfare in Italy after the
2008 financial and economic crisis, which resulted not only in serious challenges to
the public budget and the reproduction of the welfare state, but also opened lucra-
tive opportunities for private initiatives in key areas of social policy (Ascoli et al.,
2018; Guardiancich, 2019; Negrelli and Rossi, 2019). How can we illustrate and
explain this phenomenon, and what are its implications on the broader employ-
ment and welfare system? On the basis of a strategically selected mix of primary
and secondary sources (Bowen, 2009; Yin, 2014), we apply the FoR to identify and
discuss three stages of the recent diffusion of company welfare in Italy. The first
stage – expression of collaborative pluralism and, secondarily, consultative unitar-
ism – evolved around a widely known case (Luxottica) that, since 2009, has
become instrumental in nourishing a debate on the potential of welfare benefits
(Eurofound, 2012), led by an academic think-tank with strong IR connections
(Secondo Welfare) (Ferrera and Maino, 2014) and, to a lesser degree, consultancy
groups (McKinsey, 2013). The second stage – marking a unitarist drift – captures
the boost given to company welfare provisions by Renzi’s government in 2015 and
2016 through tax breaks (Eurofound, 2016). This fiscal convenience, meant to
promote company agreements focused on productivity (Leonardi, 2018), created
business opportunities and, eventually, a market for an industry which specialised
in welfare services, along with an interest organisation (Associazione Italiana
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Welfare Aziendale (AIWA)) and the support of another IR academic think-tank
(ADAPT). In the third stage, the focus is on trade union responses, in particular by
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) and Confederazione Italiana
Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL), to the diffusion of company welfare. At first, these
responses followed the ideological standpoints of diverse union confederations –
radical pluralism for CGIL, neo-pluralism for CISL – and ranged from resistance
to acceptance. In practice, we examined two relevant industrial relations outcomes
– the 2016–2019 collective agreement valid for the metal sector, and the pact on
worker participation signed in October 2019 by the social partners active in the
Milan area – in which trade unions tried to integrate company welfare provisions
within a negotiation agenda compatible with the principles of social inclusivity and
workers’ empowerment, in so doing striving for a ‘balanced’ form of pluralism.
Overall, our examination of the growing relevance of company welfare in Italy
through the analytical lenses provided by FoR aims for a thorough understanding of
the employment relationship vis-a-vis societal and political developments.
Specifically, we expand preliminary insights by scholars who investigated similar
issues in the Italian context and noted a possible ‘paradigm shift’ (Colombo and
Regalia, 2016) and a ‘seemingly minor [change] but with a strong transformative
potential’ (Sacchi, 2018: 41). Fundamentally, we contribute to academic conversa-
tions at the crossroad of IR and other social sciences in three ways. First, by recon-
structing key events in terms of FoR, we identify how company welfare affects the
reproduction of other forms of social protection (Titmuss, 1955): social welfare (pro-
vided by the state), fiscal welfare (as tax incentives for individuals and firms) and
occupational welfare (based on employment status and, recently, related to collective
actors) (Natali et al., 2018; Seelkopf and Starke, 2019). Second, by uncovering the
unitarist drivers behind the growth of companywelfare, we give credit to power-based
welfare theory (Esping Andersen, 1985, 1990; Korpi, 1983) but reverse its core argu-
ment. Our evidence, in fact, illustrates a dynamics of capital’s class struggle against
labour. Third, by using FoR to shed light on the role of intellectuals in shaping the
policy agenda, we clarify how policy discourses contribute to the creation of institu-
tional opportunities for employment and welfare reform (Schmidt, 2002). In this
sense, our study demonstrates that the IR conversation on company welfare evolves,
albeit under unitarist pressure, around the pluralist fulcrum (Gasparri, 2017), but only
those intellectuals in-between the pluralist and unitarist frame – respectively, the ‘sage’
and ‘merchant elite’ (Heery, 2016a: 65) – have an influence on the policymaking.
Reviewing, debating and expanding frames of reference
Each FoR – unitarist, pluralist and radical – reflects a particular perspective on the
nature of employment relations (see Fox, 1974 for the original illustration and
Heery, 2016a for a thorough overview). The unitarist frame assumes a common
purpose and shared goals between employers and workers, with conflict as path-
ological. The pluralist frame assumes competing interests and tensions between the
parties, with potential conflict organised by effective institutions, to the benefit of
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all. Finally, the radical frame assumes that the employment relationship is symp-
tomatic of the structural contradictions underlying capitalism and advocates work-
ers’ resistance against the resulting exploitation and coercion. Controversies
between FoR are a constant in the reproduction of IR theories which remain
anchored in pluralism, albeit amid contrasting pressures and partial deviations
(Barry and Wilkinson, 2016; Kaufman, 2004; Tapia et al., 2015). What is at
stake goes beyond IR as an academic endeavour and, ultimately, concerns
the state of its underlying pluralist project (Gomez et al., 2004; Meardi, 2014;
Heery, 2016b). In this regard, the specific object of this research, company welfare,
is significant: it features consistently in IR scholarship and has already provided
fertile ground for debating controversies between FoR, as the two following the-
oretical positions demonstrate.
On the one hand, company welfare fits into the unitarist frame when at its core
is ‘the key relationship in which unitary scholars are interested – the impact of
management practice on worker attitudes and behaviour,’ and when this relation-
ship is matched with Human Resource Management (HRM) policies that are
focused on engagement (Heery, 2016a: 124–130). At the same time, company wel-
fare might substantiate different types of unitarism, either hard/autocratic or soft/
consultative, depending on how the business case imperative is dealt with, but also
on the extent to which such benefits are unilaterally designed and directly imple-
mented by management. Early contributions, in particular, noted that company
welfare tends to express ‘soft unitarism’, often with paternalistic traits (Fox, 1974;
Purcell, 1987; recently proposed by Cullinane and Dundon, 2014). A radical cri-
tique of the unitarist kind of company welfare focuses instead on how rhetorical,
manipulative and instrumental to managerial control and discipline it can be
(Warren, 1999).
On the other hand, company welfare fits into the pluralist frame when workers
have an actual say, especially through their representatives, about its design and
implementation. Here the rationale for labour management partnership
(Donaghey, 2016) emerges: workers cooperate with managers and accept their
prerogatives when this is exchanged for employment security, wage increases or
other types of benefits, including welfare provisions. However, only ‘collaborative’
pluralists agree on the terms of this exchange, whereas ‘adversarial’ pluralists,
sharing the above-mentioned concerns by radicals, meet it with scepticism (Bray
et al., 2020). The available evidence indicates that company welfare provisions can
indeed substantiate ‘positive employment relations’ (Johnstone and Wilkinson,
2016) and that such outcome is more likely to occur when the benefits are tailored
to workers’ needs and local trade unions are involved in the process. However, the
existence of negative cases and the appreciation of the limits and risks underlying
labour management partnership (Danford, 2016) give rise to a radical critique also
of the pluralist kind of company welfare (Heery, 2016a: 119–122). Essentially, the
main issues are about the degree of influence that workers have in setting up
company welfare schemes, the effects of such schemes in terms of workers’ bar-
gaining power, and finally, the implications for the broader society (Kelly, 1996).
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In any case, IR tends to use FoR with a traditional concern for workplace
dynamics bargaining (Ackers, 2002), applying the concept at the individual cog-
nitive level, on key industrial relations actors. Typically, it is management under
the spotlight, with discussions revolving around whether they promote workplace
relations in a unitary (either in its ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ version) or a pluralist manner, if
accepting or even supporting forms of workers’ consultation and representation
(Cullinane and Dundon, 2014; Purcell, 1987). When trade unions are concerned,
instead, what matters is the orientation towards reaching a compromise with
employers (pluralist) or the continuation of the struggle for workers’ emancipation
(radical), with several options in between, clashing on how best to promote work-
ers’ interests (Dundon and Dobbins, 2015; Kelly, 1996). We propose to extend the
use of FoR beyond workplace dynamics to appreciate the connections between
employment relations and welfare policies. Such connections were evident in the
Webbs’ Industrial Democracy (1897) and The Prevention of Destitution (1911) –
classics for IR and welfare studies, respectively – but remained largely overlooked
and rarely, if ever, considered with explicit use of FoR. Reasons behind this gap
abound (Ramia, 2020), and we single out the essential ones by following a context-
based approach (Hyman, 2004), for simplicity developed around intellectual main-
streams (US, UK, Continental Europe) and outliers (Australia and New Zealand,
Sweden, Italy).
Examining intellectual mainstreams, we first look at the US and note the influ-
ence that the ‘cold war’ politics exerted on IR (Kelly, 1999). This resulted into a
version of ‘pluralism’ that reproduced, domestically, anti-mobilisation biases
(Godard, 2009) and, abroad, the ‘American normalism’ project (Streeck, 2006).
In practice, employers emerged as pivotal actor of the welfare system (Jacoby,
1998) and mainstream trade unions, unable to propose a sound alternative, con-
formed (Swenson, 2002). In theory, the dominance of a structural–functionalist
perspective in the US academia popularised the idea of an industrial relations
system – a relatively autonomous, decentralised and depoliticised system, which
censored radical voices (Hillard and McIntyre, 1999). We then move to the UK,
where instead all FoR are well established – even predating Fox’s categorisation,
as Hyman’s (1978) widely debated ‘pluralism’s pluralism’ illustrates. Such debates,
however, have largely overlooked the connections between employment relations
and social policy, focusing on the former for three reasons: an intellectual tradition
marked by workplace case study (McGovern, 2020); some reluctance, justified by
the Oxford pluralist school with the reference to ‘voluntarism’, to appreciate the
state-political arena (Ackers and Wilkinson, 2005; Howell, 2005); the presence of
critical thinkers reproducing a rather ‘orthodox’ version of Marxist thought, inter-
ested in economic militancy at the shopfloor level but overlooking those broader
links between work and society that inspired Gramscian and Eurocommunist
approaches (Ackers and Wilkinson, 2005; Ackers, 2014). Finally, the last intellec-
tual mainstream relates to corporatist theories, largely about Continental Europe.
In either its early or contemporary version, these theories appreciate the nexus
between employment relations and social policy, often investigating the
Gasparri 239
institutional and organisational preconditions upon which labour movements gain
access to policymaking (Baccaro, 2003). Nonetheless, this literature eschews the
application of FoR: the concept of corporatism, in fact, emerged to mark the
social, political and economic differences between Continental European countries
and the icon of pluralism at that time, the US (Schmitter, 1974; Streeck, 2006).
By turning to three intellectual outliers, we consider theoretical contributions
which are original in two ways: by shedding light on overlooked connections
between employment relations and welfare dynamics; and by applying FoR or,
at least, their underlying logic to new subjects. The first outliers are Australia and
New Zealand, whose employment relations’ and welfare regimes’ classifications
have been disputed. Originally placed within the liberal cluster (Esping
Andersen, 1990), Castles and Mitchell (1992) underlined instead some radical
features. Previously, Castles (1985) looked closely at how employment relations
and social policy combined in these two countries, defining their peculiarities in
terms of ‘wage-earners’ welfare state’, a unique model that integrates forms of
industry protection, restrictive immigration policy and residual social security
provisions. The second outlier is Sweden, long associated with corporatism
(Schmitter, 1974) and, as such, the case has offered a good opportunity for assess-
ing corporatist arrangements and, in particular, the role trade unions play in them.
Higgins (1985) engages with the two leading perspectives – corporatist scholarship
and the Marxist counterpart – contesting flaws on both sides. In the former, cor-
poratist developments are a response to the transformations of post-war capitalism
and trade unions are only passive adapters to these responses. In the latter, cor-
poratist developments undermine working class mobilisation and trade unions
seem incapable of using the political arena to their own advantage. Contrasting
both assessments, Higgins draws inspiration from the concept of ‘democratic class
struggle’ (Korpi, 1983) and points to the type of unionism present in Sweden,
which he defined as ‘political’ or ‘class-oriented’: the key, essentially, is to promote
vigorous mobilisation at the workplace and acquire, centrally, the tactical finesse
necessary to recognise and counter the roots of bourgeois interests. Finally, our
third ‘outlier’ is Italy, a case that combines what conventional IR wisdom consid-
ers contradictory features. The industrial relations system is inspired by both ‘vol-
untarism and institutionalisation’ (Regalia and Regini, 1998); trade unions act as
‘consolidated organisations’ as well as ‘social movements’ (Regalia, 2012). As a
result, in order to understand it, one is required to look at different areas and levels
of interventions and revisit established theories. For instance, three contributions –
‘political exchange’ (Pizzorno, 1978), ‘micro-corporatism’ (Regini, 1995) and ‘new
social pacts’/‘democratic corporatism’ (Baccaro, 2002) – have both advanced cor-
poratist theory and the application of FoR, expressing the influence of, respective-
ly, ‘progressive pluralism’, ‘political pluralism’ and ‘neo-pluralism’ among Italian
scholars (Gasparri, 2017: 322).
Having examined IR obstacles and potential for applying FoR to both employ-
ment relations and welfare dynamics, we now draw three insights from outside IR,
within the literature on social policy and welfare studies. First, we adopt the
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tripartite characterisation of a ‘welfare system’ – ‘social’, ‘fiscal’ and ‘occupational’ –
a seminal framework proposed by Titmuss (1955) to illustrate the heterogenous,
sometimes unconventional or unexpected, ways in which welfare measures emerge.
‘Social’ welfare, the most visible and referred to as the ‘public’ welfare, is the broad
array of social benefits and services provided by the state. ‘Fiscal’ welfare consists
instead of tax breaks for individuals and firms to help them provide welfare, an
area of welfare largely overlooked within the IR field despite its distributive effects
across social classes. Finally, ‘occupational’ welfare refers to benefits and services
‘provided by virtue of employment status, achievement and record, and may take
the form of social security provisions in cash or in kind’ (Titmuss, 1955: 50). A
research gap, already contested by Titmuss and still partly present, concerns the
connections between these types of welfare. Only few scholars have contributed to
fill this gap. Rein (1981), in particular, suggested the consideration of all sources of
welfare, moving from the idea of ‘welfare state’ to the one of ‘welfare economy’.
On this basis, Rein and Rainwater (1986) pushed the analysis further, embracing
the even broader concept of ‘welfare society’ and launching a pioneering compar-
ative project that looked at the intersections between public and private forms of
social protection. Contemporary scholars in social policy and IR have increased
their focus on these matters, upgrading for instance the definition of occupational
welfare, which presumes collective actors and might differ from company welfare,
which is in the remit of single employers, either with or without a role for trade
unions (Natali et al., 2018: 436). The connections between different types of wel-
fare are discussed either in Titmuss’ terms (Natali et al., 2018) or by the broader
concept of ‘social protection by other means’ (Seelkopf and Starke, 2018). The
issue is highly relevant for the Italian case, where private forms of welfare are so
far – comparatively speaking – underdeveloped (Ascoli et al., 2018) and, therefore,
their growing relevance constitutes an unprecedented challenge.
Second, by considering together work and welfare dynamics, FoR display syn-
ergies with power-based approaches to welfare studies (Castles, 1985; Esping
Andersen, 1990; Higgins, 1985; Korpi, 1983). In fact, by design, FoR are an essen-
tial instrument to identify and illustrate power (im)balances in industrial relations
which, with a more sophisticated understanding of power dynamics, can clarify
how and why power shifts between the actors involved in such relations and with
what consequences (Heery et al., 2008). Power-based welfare theories, in this
regard, offer strong analytical tools and, drawing on Esping Andersen (1985),
the three most important are as follows. First is the idea that welfare policies
constitute the arena in which workers’ demands are given a collective, political
expression. Decommodification and destratification are guiding principles to deter-
mine the effectiveness of such policies and, broadly speaking, their contribution is
to the ‘social democratisation’ of capitalism. Second is the role of party politics in
advancing working class demands, which mostly depends on how united or frag-
mented the two sides, labour and capital, are and whether/with which other social
groups they might forge alliances. Third is the recognition of the main limits of the
conservative and liberal approach to social policy. In the former, social rights are
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present but attached to occupation and status, not to citizenship; while in the latter
universal benefits are present but residual, based on targeted means-testing and
relying as much as possible on private market provision. Once we understand the
sources of power in employment relations and welfare, we can use the FoR to shed
light on their transformations. The growing relevance of company welfare in Italy,
in fact, can be informed by either unitarist or pluralist logics (not the radical, which
would push for their irrelevance, as seen above), depending on the capacity and
ability of industrial relations actors to mobilise the necessary power resources to
affect the process.
Third and finally, the advantage of applying the FoR analysis to work and
welfare dynamics is that FoR – by virtue of their ideological content – address
the question of how/when discourses underlying policy reforms help to shape the
perceptions of advantages/disadvantages produced by these reforms, something
rather overlooked in the politics of welfare regimes (Schmidt, 2002). As highlighted
by the extensive literature that applies the FoR, IR scholars have often played a
key role in these policy discourses (Kaufman, 2004). Heery develops this role in
terms of FoR by suggesting that pluralists act as a ‘sage elite’ with ‘a bias towards
addressing the mandarinate’, the unitarists as a ‘merchant elite’ primarily engaged
with corporate managers, and critical intellectuals as ‘organic’ intellectuals within
the labour and other social movements (2016a: 65). In this research, we consider
influential academics and think-tanks and examine whether and how they solve the
IR quest for balancing contrasting perspectives about work and welfare and,
specifically, about a controversial topic such as company welfare. The task has
two challenges. First, the pluralist fulcrum is questioned with scholars detecting
signs of unitarist drift (Meardi, 2014; Gasparri, 2017 for the Italian case), but also
signs of polarisation, to the advantage of not just unitarists but also the radical
frame (Tapia et al., 2015). Second, IR as an academic field is shrinking and
universities are an increasingly indifferent, if not hostile context for the subject
(Whalen, 2008). In fact, while Djelic notes that ‘universities are competing for
money and resources’, eventually transforming their mission ‘towards serving
the market’ (2012: 104–105), Edwards reminds us that ‘the final challenge [for
IR] is the demand for relevance’, adding that ‘independent, critical analysis may
be more difficult to sustain if the research agenda becomes influenced by the policy
concerns of particular interest groups’ (1995: 57).
Researching company welfare provisions in Italy
The Italian context constitutes a promising research avenue for investigating com-
pany welfare provisions through the application of FoR. The traditional features
of the Italian employment and welfare regime are well known: the Italian
case belongs to the conservative model of European ‘welfare capitalism’
(Esping Andersen, 1990) but has some peculiar features, expressed in ‘dualistic’
labour markets and a marked reliance – both economically and socially – on
families (Ferrera, 2013; Schmidt, 2002). In fact, despite some universalistic and
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egalitarian – at least on paper – components, especially as regards education,
health and wage setting, state weaknesses and inconsistences produce chronical
distortions. These are functional, with overprotection for old age at the expense
of other risks such as youth unemployment; and distributional, between insiders
and outsiders and between geographical areas. To remedy such distortions and
follow European Union (EU) cost-containment recommendations, path-breaking
reforms occurred in the mid-to late 1990s, broadly agreed with social partners
and covering tenets of the ‘social’ welfare. For example, pensions moved from a
defined-benefit to a defined-contribution system, income policy removed wage
indexation and favoured decentralised wage bargaining, labour markets liberal-
ised and the public monopoly over employment services was removed. All of
these happened amid cutbacks in key areas such as the public healthcare sector
(Ascoli et al., 2018; Jessoula and Alti, 2010). At the same time, the reforms set in
motion two dynamics relevant for the diffusion of company welfare.
First, major confederal unions and employers’ organisations began to evaluate the
potential of ‘occupational’ welfare, negotiated either centrally (the preferred choice
by unions) or locally. The latter, in particular, emerged as a strategic level for encour-
aging collaborative relations focused on mutual gains (Colombo and Regalia, 2016).
Second, ‘fiscal’ welfare measures were introduced to support company bargaining
and, possibly, occupational welfare. Since 1997, productivity-related bonus pay has
been taxed with a 10% fee, instead of much higher social contributions, but criteria to
measure productivity remain largely undefined. Since 2004, the number of tax-
exempted employee benefits have expanded, when offered unilaterally by employers.
From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, additional social insurance packages, in
particular integrative pension and healthcare programmes, have enjoyed a convenient
fiscal treatment, if social partners are involved in their design and implementation.
The resulting framework, although opening opportunities for work and welfare
dynamics at the company level, was far from coherent and legally
certain, eventually bringing mixed results. Collective agreements signed at the com-
pany level are still rather limited (Pedersini, 2020), whereas occupational health insur-
ance and occupational pensions developed at the sector level, albeit both remain a
relatively marginal phenomenon, covering considerably less workers and attracting
much lower resources than in most other European countries (Ascoli et al., 2018).
It is under such circumstances that, in the last 10 years, company welfare has
emerged as a critical topic of policy discourses and reforms of the Italian employment
and welfare regime (Negrelli and Rossi, 2019). Tellingly, leading IR and social policy
academics discuss this and related trends in terms of a ‘seemingly minor [change] but
with a strong transformative potential’ (Sacchi, 2018: 41), a sign of a possible ‘par-
adigm shift’ (Colombo and Regalia, 2016) or even an ideological shift from neoliberal
market regulation to ‘liberal neo-welfarism’ (Ferrera, 2014). In this article, we draw
on the FoR literature and Titmuss’ framework (1955) to ask the following research
questions: How can the growing relevance of company welfare in Italy be explained,
and what are its implications on the broader employment and welfare system? We
develop the analysis around three sections. In the first, we examine the potential for
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company welfare, using what we consider a path-breaking case (Luxottica and its
employment benefits plan for 2009, 2011 and 2013) and the scrutiny it received by an
academic think-tank (Secondo Welfare) and a consultancy group (McKinsey). In the
second, the promotion of company welfare through tax breaks is investigated, along
with the underlying policy process (Renzi’s government from 2014-2016 and its IR
policy advisers) and relevant business interests, especially in the industry of welfare
providers (AIWA). In the third, the focus is on trade unions, in particular CGIL and
CISL, the largest organisations with clear ideological differences. We study their
perspectives on company welfare using two illustrative cases: the 2017-2019 renewal
of the collective agreement in the metal sector, and the local pact on workers’ par-
ticipation signed in Milan in October 2019 by social partners.
In order to make sense of such events, evidence was collected on the basis of a
strategically selected mix of primary and secondary sources (Bowen, 2009; Yin, 2014).
First, a wide array of secondary sources was considered in order to illustrate, recon-
struct and understand key developments and dynamics underlying the diffusion of
company welfare. Beyond academic contributions, this part of the analysis also relied
on the abundance of material directly produced by the actors with a stake in com-
pany welfare, that is, policy-makers and state agencies, academic think-tanks,
employers and their associations, trade unions, welfare benefit providers, consultancy
firms, other interest organisations and experts. The material was analysed around five
main themes: the emerging market/industry of company welfare; the analysis of costs
and benefits of company welfare provisions for the public budget and workers; the
impact of the diffusion of company welfare on the welfare system and on wage
dynamics; the industrial relations dynamics brought about by company welfare,
especially at the local level; and finally, the state of the IR debate on company welfare
provisions. The secondary sources were then integrated with 14 interviews, conducted
between December 2018 and January 2020: eight trade unionists from different
organisations and active at different levels, two officials of a leading employers’
organisation and four scholars engaged with relevant think-tanks. Two workshops
on company welfare were also attended and observed: one organised by the largest
trade union and the other by the employers’ organisation active in the area where
most company welfare schemes have been adopted, which were, respectively, for
union delegates and for human resource managers. During the interviews – recorded
and lasting on average 1hour – we discussed the five themes set out above and
interviewees were given the opportunity to comment on existing documents, pro-
duced either by themselves directly or by the organisation that they were affiliated
to, as suggested by experts on documentary analysis (Bowen, 2009).
Framing the recent diffusion of company welfare in Italy
The potential for company welfare under the spotlight
The 2008 financial crisis, followed by a harsh public budget crisis in 2011,
exacerbated the fragilities of the Italian social system. Reforms pushed by the
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EU triggered processes of decentralisation and liberalisation (Guardiancich, 2019)
that were only partly compensated by some resilience of social partners (trade
union density is stable at around 34%) and collective forms of regulation (collec-
tive bargaining coverage is still very high, at 97%) (Pedersini, 2020). At the same
time, Italian policymakers have had to cope with low levels of economic growth
and high levels of public debt eventually leading them to focus on how to reduce
public expenditure and increase business productivity (Regalia and Regini, 2018).
Private initiatives favouring these goals were particularly appreciated. For these
reasons, the case of Luxottica, which puts company welfare at the centre of a
virtuous circle between business innovation and productivity, an enlightened and
inclusive management, engaged employees and recognised trade unions, is partic-
ularly interesting. We associate it with the early phase of the diffusion of company
welfare, a phase that, as we illustrate in the following paragraphs, brings to the
fore its potential and triggers a corresponding policy debate among academics and
practitioners at the highest level of the policymaking.
In 2009, Luxottica, the world’s largest eyewear company (with about 7,000
employees in Italy and 60,000 globally), launched an extensive and innovative
employee benefits plan for all its Italian units after a trade union–management
joint governance committee established an ‘index to make it possible to calculate
savings made by improving the production process, and reallocate them to welfare
projects’ (Eurofound, 2012). This company welfare scheme consisted of three kinds
of benefits: ‘a Shopping Card with market value of about e110 to purchase food
products manufactured by leading Italian brands’; ‘refund for school and univer-
sity textbooks’ and ‘award merit-based scholarships’ for employees’ children; and
healthcare insurance for employees and their families, including a maternity pack-
age (about 65% of the workforce are women) (Luxottica, 2013). In 2011,
Luxottica’s company agreement renewed the welfare scheme and integrated
employee benefits with work–life balance initiatives, including an increase of
‘banked hours’ (up to 120 hours, or unlimited for new parents); more opportunities
for switching to part-time contracts, especially for employees with caring duties;
and the introduction of so-called job-sharing in the family, for an employee and
his/her spouse if they were unemployed, inactive or close to completing education.
In 2013, Luxottica and the local trade unions confirmed existing measures and
even strengthened some, in particular measures for young people (e.g. more and
generous scholarships; refunds of all university fees for high-achieving employees’
children; career counselling for all young people living near to Luxottica’s facto-
ries; paid internships on condition of completion of professional qualifications;
international summer camps for employees and their families) (Mallone, 2013).
While the Luxottica case was still unfolding, a wider conversation about the poten-
tial of company welfare provisions and their benefit to business organisations and
their employees alike took off, treating this case as an example of best practice.
A prominent role in shaping this debate was played by the academic think-tank
Secondo Welfare. Created in 2011 with the support of a mainstream newspaper
(Corriere della Sera), major financial institutions, and companies such as
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Luxottica, its aim was to find and collect positive and replicable examples of
innovative forms of non-public welfare provisions, subsequently presented in bien-
nial reports (2013, 2015, 2017, 2019) (see details on secondowelfare.it). This welfare
approach encompasses heterogenous policy areas that include but also go beyond
company welfare, such as education and training, employment, housing, health,
social economy and inclusion. It is ‘second’ in three senses: temporal, in that it
comes after the golden age of welfare capitalism; functional, in that it complements
public initiatives and compensates for their gaps and limitations; and financial, in
that it relies on additional, non-public funding coming from actors like ‘private
and occupational insurance funds, the social partners (often at the local/company
level), territorial associations of various sorts, banks, foundations, philanthropic
subjects, and, last but not least, the asset-richer households’ (Ferrera and Maino,
2014: 6). Secondo Welfare engages with academic analyses of welfare transforma-
tions, substantiating expectations associated with the ‘social investment’ approach
to welfare, also promoted as an EU flagship policy approach (European
Commission, 2015). It stresses the criticality of finding additional resources for
and more tailored responses to increasingly diversified complex social needs in the
delicate context of public budget constraints (Morel et al., 2012). Resulting prac-
tices are potentially so innovative that they express an ideological shift from neo-
liberal market approaches to welfare reforms to a more inclusive orientation
inspired by ‘liberal neo-welfarism’ (Ferrera, 2014).
At the same time, it is noted that such transformative potential of emerging
forms of welfare, especially company welfare, comes with two risks attached.
One concerns the distributive implications, inasmuch as ‘by its very nature, this
kind of welfare tends to accentuate the segmentation of the labour market’
(Ferrera, 2013: 14). The other relates to political consequences:
if the middle classes get used to having dedicated (and presumably high quality) social
benefits before the welfare state has consolidated a decent and uniform network of
services for all, building this network will become more and more difficult. America’s
experience stands as proof of this, especially in the area of healthcare. (p. 14)
However, as a think-tank, Secondo Welfare focuses only on positive cases,
whereas negative examples, such as abuses and signs of distortion, are not
sought and remain overlooked, raising concerns about the balance of the
debate in the making. In this regard, the anti-trade union rhetoric expressed
by a leading figure within Secondo Welfare does not help to address these con-
cerns: wondering whether we are turning into ‘post-trade unions society’, the
journalist Di Vico suggests that the Luxottica case tells us that ‘if once the
governance of industrial relations was a matter for companies and trade
unions, now entrepreneurs consider whether they can (or should) act unilaterally’
(Di Vico, 2015).
Another key, early contribution in the debate about company welfare consists
of research by the consultancy group McKinsey on subsidiary welfare (2013),
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commissioned by a network of senior female managers in big corporations (includ-
ing Luxottica). Here we find the first estimate, subsequently widely used by schol-
ars and practitioners alike, of the added value of welfare benefits,
which McKinsey’s consultants believe convenient to employers for three reasons.
First, companies, especially large ones, spend less than the market price for these
benefits, thanks to bulk buying and, sometimes, physical assets (e.g. space for a
nursery): benefits worth e125 would cost companies about e100. Second, when
tailored to employee needs (e.g. a nursery’s opening hours compatible with work
hours and located near the workplace), welfare provisions bring an intangible extra
value: benefits worth e125 can be valued by employees as worth e170. Third,
company welfare provisions are estimated to increase employee engagement (up
to 30%) and labour productivity, resulting in a 15% reduction in days off (up to
e1.350 per year), a 5% increase of extra work (up to e1.600 per year, or 30min
on the top of a regular 8 h shift) and 1.6months shorter maternity leave (up to
e1.200) (McKinsey, 2013).
Overall, company welfare gained new currency in Italy after the 2008 crisis,
with Luxottica standing out for its ambitious, innovative and inclusive provision
of occupational welfare. The company also demonstrated how to apply an
apparently chaotic and untrustworthy set of fiscal welfare measures, either tax-
exempted benefits provided unilaterally or reduced social contributions, granted
to productivity agreements negotiated with trade unions. Soon the Luxottica case
became a common starting point for conversations about the potential of com-
pany welfare. A prominent role in shaping this debate was played by an aca-
demic think-tank, Secondo Welfare, with the aim of discovering and collecting
positive and replicable experiences of innovative forms of non-public welfare
provisions. Another key contribution was brought by the consultancy firm
McKinsey (2013), which linked the financial benefits of company welfare schemes
to cost-reduction opportunities for companies and improved employee engage-
ment and productivity. We underline that McKinsey’s consultants do not deal
with the fiscal conditions available for company welfare, possibly because, in
2013, the relevant legal framework suffered from some lack of certainty. As
illustrated in the next section, this was to be addressed by a government led
by the then secretary of the centre-left Partito Democratico (PD), Matteo
Renzi, and formed by a broad party coalition.
The promotion of company welfare through tax breaks
Renzi’s government was moved by the idea that company welfare had the potential
to create the conditions, especially if underpinned by local negotiations with trade
unions, for cooperative employment relations and business productivity, an even-
tuality that deserved some form of fiscal promotion. Company welfare was there-
fore greatly enhanced through fiscal advantages under the 2016 and 2017 budget
laws (Eurofound, 2016). The 2016 budget brought three main innovative features:
first, a broader definition of company welfare benefits eligible for fiscal advantages;
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second, the inclusion of benefits negotiated with trade unions at company level
among those eligible for income tax relief; and third, the opportunity to convert
productivity-related bonus pay, normally taxed at 10%, into non-monetary wel-
fare benefits completely exempt from tax, providing that the bonus pay does not
exceed e2.000 (e2.500 if set up by a joint committee) and the recipient does not
earn more than e50.000 per year. In 2017, the Renzi government increased these
two thresholds (bonus pay up to e3.000–e4.000 if set up by a joint committee – for
a recipient earning less than e80.000 per year). They also included integrative
pension and health insurance schemes, as well as all welfare provisions defined
by the national sector agreements, among the welfare benefit subject to the new
fiscal advantages. Overall, Renzi’s reforms widened considerably the fiscal gap
between company welfare benefits, bonus pay in cash, and pay rises, with all
our interviews confirming the following: when e10 is to be paid out to the employ-
ee, a cash solution would cost the company e14 and result in e6 of net income,
whereas the welfare benefit solution would cost the company e10 and also result in
e10 of expendable welfare benefits, therefore without any tax contribution.
Following these fiscal advantages, the recourse to company welfare provisions
has grown remarkably: companies without any welfare benefit decreased from
18.4% in 2016 to 7.6% in 2019, while companies with at least five welfare benefits
increased from 26.2% to 44.6%. In addition, the number of company agreements
containing welfare measures passed from 10% in 2013 to 20% in 2016 (Welfare
Index PMI, 2019: 13). This growth was accompanied by a mushrooming of welfare
providers, ranging from start-ups and social cooperatives to multinational compa-
nies and major financial national organisations (Razetti and Santoni, 2019).
Although variegated and fast-changing, the business model present in the welfare
provision industry typically emerged around a digital platform and, over time,
increased its ties with the banking and insurance sector. In 2017, some of the
main welfare providers joined forces to launch the first, so far the only existing,
interest organisation of private welfare operators, the AIWA (see details on aiwa.
it). The general secretary of AIWA, Emmanuele Massagli, is also the president of
ADAPT, a key academic think-tank that is increasingly involved in the study of
company welfare and the provision of training for new organisational roles such as
welfare managers (Massagli et al., 2018). AIWA’s website1 stresses its non-profit
nature and the cultural challenge involved, which resonates well with the unitarist
HR discourse and is summed up in the bottom-line message (the only content
available in English) that ‘Being happy at work really makes people more produc-
tive!’. Dismissing those who argue that the diffusion of company welfare provi-
sions was purely a result of the favourable tax conditions since 2015, AIWA
campaigns for an orderly growth of the industry, which has, as is clear from dif-
ferent contributions to its website, already benefitted from substantial market
opportunities and still expects to grow further.
In examining the policy-making processes, attention was paid to who proposed
and designed the legal and fiscal reforms that promoted the diffusion of company
welfare. Following the 2013 general election, a parliamentary majority in Italy was
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formed by a coalition between main centre-left and centre-right parties (respec-
tively, PD and Il Popolo della Libertà, PdL). Enrico Letta took office as PM but,
after a turnaround within PD, he was quickly replaced by Matteo Renzi. As
emerged in our interviews, the fiscal incentives for company welfare were proposed
and then supported in parliamentary audits by a working group composed of
scholars, in particular from academic institutions in Milan, as well as the think-
tanks Secondo Welfare and ADAPT. A few corporate lawyers joined the group
but not, at least in its original phase, social partners – in line with the ‘disinter-
mediation’ approach to industrial relations adopted by Renzi (Tassinari, 2019:
179–185). PdL, meanwhile, maintained a key role with Maurizio Sacconi, who
chaired the Committee on Labour in the Senate (formerly Minister for Labour
and Social Policy in 2008-2011 Berlusconi’s governments, now Head of the
Steering Committee of ADAPT). Marco Leonardi, a professor acting as
Economic Counsellor to PM Renzi, wrote about the policymaking underlying
these reforms, stating that the government approach to company welfare followed
the idea that, by creating opportunities for trade union-management cooperation,
company productivity would have increased and, as such, it deserved to be
rewarded for the positive externality to the whole country (Leonardi, 2018: 55, 59).
A more critical outlook on this policymaking pointed instead at the ‘neoliberal’
nature of the fiscal reforms promoting company welfare and illustrated the ‘asym-
metrical’ process underpinning such reforms, which eventually express a case of
‘strong politics’. This is driven by the emergence of a ‘bloc bourgeois’, led by the
main employers’ organisation (Confindustria) and assisted by Renzi’s party (PD)
along with the moderate union (CISL) (Mallone et al., 2019: 62–63). At the same
time, with a declining influence of Matteo Renzi over the centre-left polity, more
critical voices questioned the labour market and welfare policy reforms approved
under his leadership. As regards company welfare provisions, the discussion evolved
around their total costs and benefits for the public budget. On the one hand, Treu
(2019), a leading academic (Past President of ILERA, The International Labour and
Employment Relations Association) and former Minister for Labour and Social
Policy (1995–1998), now president of Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economia e del
Lavoro, a tripartite commission on welfare and work matters (CNEL) (a tripartite
commission on welfare and work matters), asks whether the cost for the collectivity
is justified by a general interest. He suggests that more controls and a more stringent
classification of benefits – favouring, for instance, long-term care over benefits such
as entertainment – are needed. On the other hand, Massagli (2019), AIWA’s chief,
underlined the financial advantages for the collectivity potentially brought about by
company welfare. For example, employee benefits cannot be saved and so their
consumption brings VAT; these benefits cover services that otherwise would likely
be in the informal economy, such as babysitting and caring; and finally, company
welfare means better organisational well-being and eventually productivity, and
therefore output, jobs and taxes.
In summary, although this policy initiative was meant to create the incentives
for cooperative and participative industrial relations, especially at the company
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level (Leonardi, 2018), the more the process unfolded, the more other players came
onto the scene. Among them, we focused on private welfare providers, their inter-
est organisation (AIWA) and affinity with another academic think-tank (ADAPT),
arguably more interested in seizing a market opportunity than promoting general
interests and the common good (Massagli et al., 2018). More critical assessments
of the diffusion of company welfare have recently emerged: some highlight the
‘neoliberal’ nature of the policymaking behind the approval of fiscal incentives to
company welfare (Mallone et al., 2019: 62–63); others question the convenience of
such incentives for the public budget (Treu, 2019). Finally, the preliminary evi-
dence on the diffusion of company welfare tells a story of wide imbalances in terms
of geographical area, sector and company size, resulting in the concentration of
these provisions in the northern part of the country (especially in the Lombardy
region), manufacturing (especially the metal sector) and larger enterprises (Razetti
and Santoni, 2019), eventually reproducing chronic inequalities of economic and
social developments in Italy (Pizzuti, 2019). The next section looks at how, wheth-
er, and to what extent trade unions responded to the diffusion of company welfare
and tried to redress these problematic features.
Trade unions and company welfare
Trade unions came late to discussions about company welfare, being initially
excluded from policymaking and in a rather delicate position. In fact, although
external constraints following the crisis translated into a limited capacity to call for
wage increases, trade unions still needed to deliver results to existing members and
attract new ones (Regalia and Regini, 2018). According to its proponents, com-
pany welfare provisions tied to productivity outline a solution for trade unions,
inasmuch workers remain free to opt for converting a productivity bonus into a
cash lump sum (subject to taxation) or to have it in the form of welfare benefits
(tax-free) (Leonardi, 2018). However, discussions about the implications of such
solutions for the industrial relations and welfare system brought to the fore dif-
ferent ideological positions. As known, the identity of Italian unionism resides in
between class and society, at some distance from the ‘market pole’ (Hyman, 2001).
Looking at the two largest union confederations, CGIL’s identity tends towards
class (and the logic of industrial democracy) and CISL’s tends towards society (and
the logic of partnership and associational membership) (Gasparri et al., 2019).
As reported in published interviews (translated and, for stylistic reasons,
slightly edited), CGIL was critical and sceptical of the potential of company
welfare. Focusing on tax breaks for company welfare, a national secretary noted
their ‘regressive’ nature, a ‘paradox in times of public budget constraints’ and a
‘contradiction for a welfare system aiming for solidarity’ (Dettori, 2017). Another
national secretary added that ‘CGIL should not contribute to set up a company-
based welfare system, where eventually company power prevails in negotiations, as
it happened in the US’ (Colla, 2013). By comparison, CISL was relatively open and
favourable to company welfare provisions, reflecting a positive orientation towards
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non-monetary forms of compensation, a possible legacy of the Catholic social
doctrine. In the words of one of their national secretaries
company welfare plays a strategic function, complementary rather than substitute to the
public welfare, a function beneficial to companies as well as workers and not just due to
the existing fiscal advantages, but providing that we become part of the process, also to
tie company welfare benefits to real, rather than consumeristic, needs of workers and
their families. (Petteni, 2018)
We now illustrate two cases in which trade unions went beyond their ideological
differences to address some key challenges for the regulation of work and the
welfare system, with implications for the diffusion of company welfare.
The renewal of the collective agreement valid in the metal sector is arguably the
most important in the country both for its substantive and its symbolic value. On
the occasion of the 2017–2019 renewal, the agreement covered 1.6 million workers
and followed an intense period of negotiation with 20-hour of strikes. It was
eventually signed by all three major union confederations after the proposal of
agreement (26 November 2016) was approved by the majority of workers (80%),
leaving behind years of union division and failure to agree due to the lack of
approval from the largest organisation, FIOM-CGIL (Benassi et al., 2019). An
innovative element introduced by the contract dealt with company welfare benefits.
It required employers to provide employees with ‘flexible welfare benefits’ of the
value of e100 for 2017, e150 for 2018, e200 for 2019, a credit to be spent on
existing measures – bipartite health and retirement funds – or on others from
the broadest range of possible benefits such as cultural and sport events, pay-tv
and magazine subscriptions, pilgrimage, fuel cost, mobile recharge, etc. The aim of
these measures was twofold: first, they could foster more participatory experiences
at plant level (Telljohann, 2019: 410); second, as the general secretary of FIOM-
CGIL stated, the fact that they were tied to an industry agreement could prevent a
disorganised decentralisation of industrial relations dynamics and preserve social
components underlying an effective welfare system (Re David, 2017). In addition,
as all trade union officials we interviewed stressed, the renewed metal agreement
included another, rather overlooked, key component, the individual right to train-
ing (24 hours in 3 years, either in-house or outsourced with workers entitled to paid
leave). This aspect, in their view, was at the core of the idea of economic partic-
ipation that trade unions were trying to promote, an idea in which company wel-
fare also played a role, albeit of minor importance.
In relation to the local agreement on workers’ participation signed in Milan in
October 2019, we remind that Milan and the Lombardy region are often perceived
as national frontrunners in terms of economic and social progresses, as well as that
the above-mentioned evidence demonstrates that the diffusion of company welfare
is highly concentrated in Lombardy (Razetti and Santoni, 2019). The agreement,
known as ‘Participation Deal’, affirms the principles underlying the ‘Factory Deal’
signed by social partners at the national level in late February 2018, which stressed
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the relevance of collective bargaining in times of business restructuring due to
technological advancements (Gasparri and Tassinari, 2020; Pedersini, 2020). It
then identifies a set of concrete practices to fulfil them, such as joint workshops
and training activities, including engagement with experts and academics to iden-
tify positive cases and best practice for the implementation of digital and techno-
logical innovation. Company welfare provisions, albeit not directly covered in the
agreement, can fit into what inspires the deal. In this case an idea of consensual
employment relations, focused on practical ways to maximise workers’ participa-
tion in company decisions as well as the business imperative of enhancing produc-
tivity. Interestingly, the way the signatories advertised the ‘participation deal’
varies considerably. On one side, the employers’ organisation (Assolombarda)
claimed it is about the promotion of company welfare. Conversely, the general
secretaries who signed the agreement for CGIL and CISL, alongside the function-
aries supervising its implementation, consider company welfare as only a possible
outcome secondary to the main goal underlying the deal, which is the search for
effective organisational solutions to enhance workers’ participation.
In this section we focused on trade unions and, in particular, CGIL and CISL,
the largest confederations with straightforward ideological differences. The evi-
dence we collected confirmed a ‘battle of ideas’ (Hyman, 2001) between trade
unions based on contrasting perspectives on company welfare. CGIL is sceptical
of the virtues of company welfare, seeing its diffusion as hardly compatible with a
sustainable reproduction of the public ‘social’ welfare, but remains open to dis-
cussion, providing that it addresses real workers’ needs and that it becomes an
instrument to strengthen workers’ voice in business decisions, in line with the
union’s aspiration to industrial democracy. CISL is instead more positively ori-
ented to the emergence of company welfare, considered as expression of the con-
sensual basis and the win–win prospect that positive employment relations
presume. This is consistent with a partnership approach and values present in
the Catholic social doctrine, such as social harmony between classes. At the
same time, we also noted that, over the last years, trade unions have engaged
with pragmatic discussions about how to affect the diffusion of company welfare.
In doing so, they have bridged their ideological differences in order to propose
joint solutions to current problems in the regulation of work and employment, as
demonstrated in two illustrative cases.
Balancing frames on company welfare in Italy
In Table 1, we map along the FoR spectrum the key facts and positions, combining
the theories that we consider relevant to explain the diffusion of company welfare
with the practice that we observed for the Italian case and illustrated around three
phases.
The first phase consists of the emergence of company welfare provisions as a
promising form of occupational welfare after the 2008 economic crisis and the 2011
public budget crisis severely questioned the capacity of social welfare in Italy.
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A cutting-edge case, Luxottica, acted as sparkle to light up a debate on the poten-
tial of such provisions. A think-tank related to academia, Secondo Welfare, has
nourished this debate since 2011, joined by business-driven actors such as financial
major organisations. In terms of FoR, it is straightforward to see Luxottica’s and
Secondo Welfare’s approach to company welfare in terms of pluralism, arguably
of the collaborative kind (Bray et al., 2020). Luxottica, in fact, expresses an
‘enlightened’ management, to some extent paternalistic but also inclusive of
trade unions (Grandi, 2017; Mallone, 2013); Secondo Welfare instead draws inspi-
ration from this company best practice and promotes a debate on factors condu-
cive to win–win organisational solutions (Ferrera and Maino, 2014), seen as
expression of ‘social investment’ (European Commission, 2015; Morel et al.,
2012) and ‘liberal neo-welfarism’ (Ferrera, 2014). Vice versa, McKinsey (2013)
advocates the ‘business case’ for company welfare provisions and stresses its link
with employee satisfaction, well-being and productivity, therefore conceiving such
measures as convenient ‘soft’ HRM techniques and reflecting a perspective
inspired by consultative unitarism (Bray et al., 2020).
The second phase expresses the fiscal welfare measures that boosted the dif-
fusion of company welfare in Italy. These tax breaks, introduced by Renzi’s
governments in 2015 and 2016, opened business opportunities that translate
into a new market for welfare providers and an industry whose main operators
team up to create an interest organisation (AIWA). In terms of FoR, we move to
a controversial position, much closer to the unitarist pole. The unitarist drift is
manifest in the case of AIWA and the related IR think-tank ADAPT, whose
contributions on company welfare reflect an enthusiasm for growing opportu-
nities, in terms of business and practitioners-led research (Massagli et al., 2018).
It is instead more nuanced in the case of Renzi’s IR policy advisers,
whose analyses include clear pluralistic elements. In fact, although Renzi’s
policy-making was marked by ‘disintermediation’ and the exclusion of social
partners from structured political exchange at the national level (Tassinari,
Table 1. Balancing frames on company welfare (CW) in Italy.
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2019: 179–185), his IR policy advisers underlined the opportunities that such
reforms would create for social partners at the decentralised level, increasing the
chances for pragmatic solutions, both consensual and productivity oriented
(Leonardi, 2018: 55–59). The prospects of ‘positive employment relations’ is,
indeed, backed by evidence from even more difficult, market-oriented contexts
(Johnstone and Wilkinson, 2016). However, what observed in relation to the
diffusion of company welfare in the Italian case suggests that ‘positive’ experi-
ences are so far rather episodic and concentrated (Pizzuti, 2019; Razetti and
Santoni, 2019), as corroborated in our interviews even by most sympathetic
supporters to such developments (Secondo Welfare). As seen, a more critical
assessment emerged recently and pointed at the ‘neoliberal’ nature of the fiscal
reforms supporting company welfare (Mallone et al., 2019: 62).
The third phase focuses on trade unions – here only the two largest ones, CGIL
and CISL – and how they reacted to the growing relevance of company welfare. At
first, when company welfare provisions boomed in the aftermath of 2015 and 2016
fiscal reforms and trade unions were excluded from the relevant policymaking,
their reactions matched their different ideological standpoints (Gasparri et al.,
2019; Hyman, 2001). CISL, whose identity tends towards ‘society’, welcomed
the prospects of company welfare provisions, seen as expression of industrial
relations inspired by collaborative pluralism, although – in practice and in partic-
ular at the early stage – CISL played a relatively marginal role in the diffusion of
such provisions, something that makes CISL’s position compatible with consulta-
tive unitarism (Bray et al., 2020). Vice versa, CGIL, whose identity tends towards
‘class’, opposed the diffusion of company welfare provisions, noting the risks for
the social welfare, and contested policy reforms that, as fiscal welfare measures
introduced by the Renzi’s government, can be considered as employers’ friendly.
Displaying an ’adversarial’ orientation, CGIL’s position reflects typical concerns
present within the radical and critical pluralist frame (Danford, 2016; Heery,
2016a: 119–122; Kelly, 1996). However, over time, and in particular after 2017,
trade unions regained the initiatives and tried to integrate company welfare pro-
visions in their negotiating agenda. As our two examples demonstrate (the 2017–
2019 contract renewal for the metal sector; the ‘Participation Deal’ signed in Milan
in October 2019), company welfare became one factor among others – beginning
with training opportunities – that trade unions consider as enabling constructive
discussions, if not partnership, with management and through which workers
strive to participate meaningfully in company decision-making, in particular as
regards organisational innovation, competences and skills (Gasparri and Tassinari,
2020). In this sense, moving beyond their ideological differences, trade unions
engage with challenges brought about by company welfare and indicate possible
solutions in which their concerns are met, delineating the prospects for ‘positive’
industrial relations (Johnstone and Wilkinson, 2016) which, in terms of FoR,
substantiate a relatively well-balanced form of collaborative pluralism (Bray
et al., 2020).
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Conclusion
In this article, we have examined the growing relevance of company welfare that
occurred in Italy after the 2008 crisis, testing FoR in an original manner by enlarg-
ing the perspective beyond workplace-level dynamics to include welfare and
employment policies. Making the most of the double-edged nature of FoR, the
analysis advances our understanding of the corresponding controversies in practice
as well as theory (Barry and Wilkinson, 2016; Kaufman, 2004; Tapia et al., 2015;
Heery, 2016a). As for the practice, our findings demonstrate that best practice in
one company (Luxottica) and fiscal welfare policies (tax breaks for the provision of
employee benefits) have played a key role in the promotion of company welfare
(Grandi, 2017; Mallone, 2013). However, its diffusion has so far disproportionally
focused on some sectors (large companies in manufacture) and areas (Northern
region, especially Lombardy), therefore questioning the reproduction of a more
universalistic and egalitarian form of social welfare (Pizzuti, 2019; Razetti and
Santoni, 2019). Company welfare practices, in other words, express a mix of
unitarist and pluralist employment relations, with two factors standing out as
crucial to determine their developments: one is the political landscape and, in
particular, the political positions of the institutional left, as the Renzi’s parabola
within the main centre-left party demonstrates (in the ascending phase, unitarist
components grew; in the descending phase, critical positions gained relevance).
The other is the degree of involvement of trade unions in the policymaking as
their involvement strengthened pluralist employment relations, in both collabora-
tive and, depending on the leftist CGIL, adversarial versions (Guardiancich, 2019).
The assessment of these practices is, however, mixed. On one side, if the emphasis is
put on the pluralistic features, the relatively few but promising good practices of
company welfare fit well into expectations attached to both the ‘social investment’
welfare paradigm (European Commission, 2015; Ferrera, 2014; Morel et al., 2012)
and ‘positive employment relations’ (Johnstone and Wilkinson, 2016). On the other
side, upon critical reflection on all FoR, we conclude that the growing relevance of
company welfare is mostly driven by a political and economic rent-seeking elite
(Mallone et al., 2019: 62), mobilised to affirm unitarist employment relations and
to dismantle the universalistic and redistributive components present in the welfare
system. This conclusion confirms Titmuss’ caustic assessment of occupational wel-
fare (1955, 1959) and Esping Andersen’s concerns regarding private forms of welfare
(1985: 237). It also reverses the ‘democratic class struggle’ principle behind power-
based welfare theory (Korpi, 1983): we claim, in fact, that the case here under
examination offers an example of capital’s class struggle against labour.
As for the theory, two contiguous sub-frames, consultative unitarism (expressed
by the IR think-tank ADAPT) and collaborative pluralism (expressed by another
think-tank, Secondo Welfare, and Renzi’s IR advisors), set the tone for the debate
on company welfare. A more critical perspective emerged only more recently
(Mallone et al., 2019; Pizzuti, 2019: 15). On the basis of Heery’s application of
FoR to IR intellectuals (2016a: 69), we identify in mainstream contributions a
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‘merchant elite’ primarily engaged with corporate managers and inspired by uni-
tarism (Massagli et al., 2018), and a ‘sage elite’ of ‘would-be institution-builders’
aligned with a collaborative pluralism (Ferrera and Maino, 2014; Leonardi, 2018).
Looking instead at IR as a subject of study, this analysis substantiates recent
developments of IR in Italy (Gasparri, 2017), where leading institutions moved,
albeit in different manner, the pluralist fulcrum towards the unitarist frame. As far
as the IR think-tanks are concerned, we urge them to address ‘questions of the
conditions under which co-funding is appropriate, and of the problems of retaining
complete independence from interest groups’ (Edwards, 1995: 57); in this case,
welfare providers and the financial sector. At the same time, we believe that IR,
to preserve the emancipatory traits underlying its project, has to take care to
balance the debate on contemporary transformations of work in a larger sense,
which can be done by constantly renewing the application of FoR (Gomez et al.,
2004). As Heery wrote (2015: 38–39), ‘it is through advancing and defending posi-
tions against rival frames that arguments are strengthened, interpretations are clar-
ified, and new research is born’. Our goal is to offer a contribution in this direction.
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